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Chapter 1
Introduction
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) refers to a constellation of satellites continuously
broadcasting signals used by GNSS receivers to compute their position on Earth. Existing GNSS
systems include European Galielo, USA's NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) and
Russia's Global'naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS). GNSS has become
crucial for many applications [1] besides general user navigation applications such as vehicles,
airplanes and ships. Agriculture makes extensive use of positioning services: farm planning, ﬁled
mapping, tractor guidance and crop scouting. Environment-related applications help decision
makers providing useful data about items that are spread across many kilometers of terrain.
Aerial studies of some of the world's most impenetrable wilderness are conducted with the aid of
GPS technology to evaluate an area's wildlife, terrain, and human infrastructure. Rail systems
uses positioning informations to constantly track trains positions. Combined with other sensor
networks, GNSS helps reduce accidents, delays, and operating costs. In addition to geographic
positioning GNSS provides accurate timing informations. Each GPS satellite is equipped with
atomic clocks that enable users to determine the time to within 100 billionths of a second,
without the cost of owning and operating atomic clock. Each Galileo satellite is equipped with a
passive hydrogen maser clock [2], an atomic clock that forces atoms to jump from one particular
energy state to another. Jumps between energy states happen at extremely stable frequency
and are then exploited to measure time. Precise timing is also used in a variety of applications
such as many economic activities around the world. Timestamps are combined with ﬁnancial
transactions to maintain records and traceability.
Due to the spreading of such applications and the strategic nature of some of them, interest
has risen in the possible threats GNSS may face. GPS spooﬁng devices have been built [12]
and attacks have been demonstrated such as a yacht navigation system being under control of a
group of researchers [3]. On 22 June 2017 at least 20 ships oﬀ the Russian port of Novorossiysk
reported the same strange behaviour of their GNSS equipment [4], suggesting that Russia may
be testing a new system for spooﬁng GPS.
Defences against spooﬁng attacks are widely studied in the literature and in this thesis we
propose a new authentication protocol for Galileo GNSS signal based on information-theoretic
security concepts. In Chapter 2 we revise the literature and go into some detail of certain type
of attacks and defence. In Chapter 3 we describe the proposed authentication protocol together
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with its design objectives and performance metrics. Chapter 4 is devoted to numerical results.
In the Appendices we revise the well established theoretical results that were useful in the design
of the protocol.
Chapter 2
Positioning attacks
In this Chapter we ﬁrst describe the Galileo system architecture and the modulations used in its
signaling. Then we revise the literature about spooﬁng attacks and main defence techniques.
2.1 Galielo System Architecture
Galielo is the European global satellite-based navigation system and provides positioning and
timing informations to all users worldwide. It has been designed to be interoperable and com-
patible with the other existing GNSS [5].
The Galileo system, once fully operational, will oﬀer four high-performance services:
 Open Service (OS): a free of charge service accessible worldwide that oﬀers time and posi-
tioning informations.
 Commercial Service (CS): a complementary service using diﬀerent frequency bands to oﬀer
higher quality services. It can be encrypted in order to control access to it.
 Public Regulated Service (PRS): a service meant to be used only by governmental institu-
tions. It provides high level service continuity for sensitive applications.
 Search and Rescue Service (SAR): this service involves locating and helping people in
distress. It will be available at sea, in the mountains, across the desert and in the air inside
the Galileo/SAR Service Coverage area. This essential Galileo service helps operators
respond to a distress signal faster and more eﬃciently.
The history of the Galileo programme starts in February 1999 when its name ﬁrst appears
in oﬃcial European Commission documents [6] and funds were allocated starting from the early
2000s. In December 2005 and April 2008 were launched the ﬁrst two experimental satellites which
started the In-Orbit Validation (IOV) phase. IOV consists in doing environment measurements
(radiations, magnetic ﬁelds) and start the testing of communications equipment. The launch
of the operational satellites began in October and at the time this thesis is being written 18
Galielo satellites are orbiting the Earth with working supporting ground stations. The Full
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Operational Capacity (FOC) phase consists in the deployment of the remaining ground and
space infrastructure: the full Galielo system will comprise a constellation of 30 satellites.
Together with the satellite constellation the system architecture also comprises the Galielo
Ground Segment [8] consisting of two main control centers (Control Center Components GCC)
and a global network of transmitting and receiving stations. The two control centers manage
control functions supported by the dedicated Galileo Control System (GCS) and Galielo Mis-
sion System (GMS). GCS is responsible for the satellite constellation management and provides
control functions for all Galileo satellites. It comprises a global network of telemetry tracking
and control stations which communicate with GCC through a dedicated network infrastructure.
GCS is responsible for the uplink of the navigation data built in the navigation signals. It uses
a global network of Galileo Sensor Stations (GSS) in order to compute orbit informations and
clock oﬀsets for each satellite. These informations are then uploaded to the satellites periodically
every 100 minutes.
2.1.1 Galileo signal
The GNSS satellites continuously transmit navigation signals and the receiver basic observable is
the travelling time of the navigation signal to propagate from the satellite antenna to the receiver
antenna. This value is then multiplied by the speed of light to obtain a measure of the distance
between them. Then the user position is computed using distance measurements coming from
at least four satellites, as we describe later.
The signal broadcast by the satellites has two main components [8].
1. Ranging codes: a sequence of 0s and 1s which is crucial for the receiver to determine
the time distance from the satellite. They are also called Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN)
sequences due to their correlation properties.
2. Navigation data: a binary encoded message carrying informations on satellites position,
ephemeris, clock correction informations and other complementary parameters. The user
cannot determine his position by looking only at the ranging codes, he needs also the
navigation data.
PRN codes are such that the autocorrelation function has a peak only at zero lag. This is the
reason for the name Pseudo-Random Noise: the autocorrelation function resembles the one of an
uncorrelated noise signal, but PRN codes are actually deterministic sequences (Pseudo-Random).
In other words: when a PRN sequence is correlated with an aligned replica of itself the correlation
is maximum; when the PRN sequence is correlated with a non aligned replica of itself or with a
diﬀerent PRN sequence, then the correlation is low.
Modulation
Galileo system employs spread spectrum techniques to modulate its signals [34]. We concentrate
on the signal transmitted in the E1 band, reserved for civilian use.
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The signal comprises two channels, the data channel and the pilot channel, superimposed
and distinguishable thanks to diﬀerent PRN sequences. The data channel is
p(t) =
∑
i
d`ci rect
( t− 1/2− iTc
Tc
)
` =
⌊
i
Nc
⌋
, (2.1)
where d` is the binary data stream, ci are the spread spectrum coeﬃcients (PRN symbols), Nc
is the number of PRN symbols (also called chips) forming a data symbol and Tc is the chip
duration. If we deﬁne the spread spectrum symbol pulse as
ss(t) ,
Nc−1∑
i=0
ci rect
( t− 1/2− iTc
Tc
)
(2.2)
then p(t) can be rewritten as
p(t) =
∑
i
diss(t− iTs), (2.3)
where Ts is the symbol period. The pilot channel is similar to p(t), but without the data
component, i.e.,
eE1p(t) =
∑
i
cp,i rect
( t− iTc
Tc
)
. (2.4)
Each channel is then modulated by a linear combination of two square-wave subcarriers
sd(t) = p(t)
[
α sgn(sin(2pif1t)) + β sgn(sin(2pif2t))
]
(2.5)
se(t) = eE1p(t)
[
α sgn(sin(2pif1t))− β sgn(sin(2pif2t))
]
(2.6)
with α =
√
10
11 , β =
√
1
11 , f1 = 1023 MHz, f2 = 6138 MHz. Then the two signals are added and
power normalized. The baseband signal is
sE1(t) =
1√
2
(sd(t)− se(t)). (2.7)
Fig 2.1 shows a chip period of the superimposed two subcarriers, both for the data and pilot
signals.
2.1.2 Receiver structure
Although the precise architecture of a GNSS receiver varies substantially according to diﬀerent
manufacturers and implementations, the basic building blocks remain the same. We can identify
four diﬀerent components.
1. Antennas: they are the main interface between the GNSS space segment and the user
segment and are designated to capture signals within the E1 band (in case of civilian
applications) together with noise and possible interference.
10 CHAPTER 2. POSITIONING ATTACKS
Figure 2.1: One chip period of the subcarriers of equations (2.5) (left) and (2.6) (right). Figure
from [34].
Figure 2.2: GNSS baseband signal processing block diagram. Figure from [8].
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2. Front-end : it is the section responsible for preparing the received signals for later signal
processing. Its main tasks are ﬁltering and amplifying signals within useful frequency
bands, down-conversion to baseband, and quantization so to digitize information.
3. Baseband signal processing : a set of signal processing algorithms used to acquire and track
the diﬀerent signals.
4. Applications processing : processing of the low level data in order to fulﬁl the needs of
speciﬁc applications, e.g. position, velocity and timing (PVT).
We now describe the baseband signal processing function, whose block diagram is shown in Fig.
2.2.
Baseband signal processing is a dynamic system because signals and satellites in line of sight
vary greatly in time and the receiver needs to continuously search and track these changes. As
soon as the received signal enters the baseband processing block it is stripped of its Doppler
frequency according to the current carrier phase estimate. The local code generator generates a
local replica of the PRN code used by the satellite being tracked. The local replica is time shifted
matching the code delay of the received signal in order to have high correlation peak. The output
of the correlation is always noisy and needs further processing. This is the task of the Integration
and Dump (I & D) block, which integrates over time the correlator output in order to increase
the power of any potential peak and to reduce noise. The receivers updates signals parameters
thanks to tracking loops, which elaborate correlator outputs and reﬁne current estimates. The
Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracks the code delay while the Phase Lock Loop (PLL) follows the
phase of the incoming signal.
2.1.3 Determining user position
As described in the previous section, the receiver generates a local replica of the ranging code
and continuously correlates it with the signal coming from the satellite [7]. The correlation is
computed at diﬀerent lag values until a peak is found. That lag is the propagation time of the
signal, and we call it ∆t. The true geometric range, i.e. the geometric distance form satellite to
user, is then
r = c∆t, (2.8)
where c is the speed of light. By introducing vector notation, as shown in Fig. 2.3, r is the
magnitude of vector r connecting the user to the satellite. u is the vector representing user
position on Earth and its three components (ux, uy, uz) are the solutions of the positioning
problem. The best suited coordinate system for this computation is the Earth-Centred, Earth-
Fixed (ECEF) coordinate system. s is the vector connecting Earth center to the satellites and it
is a known quantity because its part of the navigation message sent by the satellite. The relation
between vectors is
r = ||r|| = ||s− u||, (2.9)
where || · || denotes the norm of a vector.
The geometric range however is not measured exactly by the receiver, due to clock synchro-
nization errors. Speciﬁcally the satellite makes an error, with respect to the system time, when
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User
Earth
Figure 2.3: User position vector notation.
measuring the time of the departure of the signal and the user makes an error when measuring
the time of arrival of the signal. Clock oﬀsets introduced by the satellites are readily corrected
by the GMS component of the ground segment and thus can be neglected by the user. User's
time oﬀset tu instead is an unknown quantity that needs to be estimated because it aﬀects range
measurements. We call pseudorange ρ the actual distance computed by the receiver and it is
given by
ρ = c(∆t + tu) = r + ctu (2.10)
and using (2.9) we can write
ρ = ||s− u||+ ctu. (2.11)
The total number of unknowns is four: ux, uy, uz and tu. To compute the solution we need
at least four range measurements from four diﬀerent satellites. We index satellites with variable
j going from 1 to 4. We can then write the system of equations
ρj =
√
(xj − ux)2 + (yj − uy)2 + (zj − uz)2 + ctu for j = 1, . . . , 4. (2.12)
This is a non linear system which can be resolved in diﬀerent ways according to the speciﬁc
receiver implementation. Three possible options are: closed form solution [9]; iterative algorithm
based on linearization; Kalman ﬁltering, which exploits past series of time measurements to
obtain a more accurate position estimate.
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2.2 Spooﬁng
Spooﬁng of GNSS signals is a set of techniques that a malicious user intentionally uses in order
to induce false ranging measurements to a legitimate user. The existence of such techniques was
particularly pointed out starting from 2001 in the so called Volpe report [14] were the authors
warned that "as GPS further penetrates into the civil infrastructure, it becomes a tempting
target that could be exploited by individuals, groups or countries hostile to the US".
One of the simplest spooﬁng techniques is meaconing, i.e., the interception and rebroadcast of
the navigation signals so that the victim computes the ranging information based on the spoofer
location, and not on the satellites'. More sophisticated versions of this attack selectively forge
delayed versions of the ranging signals so that the spoofer can freely decide the false position
detected by the victim. Several detection techniques have been proposed [15] [16] that work on
the diﬀerences between the true satellite signal and the spoofed one. One of these techniques
[17] exploits receiver's automatic gain control to detect a sudden increase of received power due
to the beginning of a spooﬁng attack.
Using multiple antennas [18] at the the receiver can increase the detection performances
thanks to the determination of the angle of arrival of the received signals. This forces the spoofer
to not only compute selective delays for each transmitted signal, but also to pay attention to the
geometry of the signal directions. In [19] and [20] multi antenna techniques are proposed using
commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) receivers.
Spooﬁng attack general model
As suggested in [10] we can model a generic GNSS legitimate and malicious signal in the following
way.
We call y(t) a generic GNSS legitimate received signal
y(t) = <
{
N∑
i=1
AiDi[t− τi(t)]Ci[t− τi(t)]ej[ωct−φi(t)]
}
, (2.13)
where the parameters are listed below:
 N is the number of signals arriving at the receiver, each coming from a diﬀerent satellite.
As we saw in section 2.1.3 the receiver needs at least four satellites to perform PVT
calculations, but usually more than four satellites are visible from the receiver antenna;
 Ai is the amplitude of each signal;
 Di(t) is the data signal carrying navigation data: in Galileo signals this correspond to d`
of equation (2.1);
 Ci(t) is the ranging code use by the ith signal and τi(t) is its current code delay;
 ωc and φi(t) are respectively the carrier frequency and the carrier phase.
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The malicious entity, the spoofer, who wants to deceive the legitimate user, the defender, has
to send a set of signals similar to the legitimate ones:
ys(t) = <
{
Ns∑
i=1
AsiDˆi[t− τsi(t)]Ci[t− τsi(t)]ej[ωct−φsi(t)]
}
. (2.14)
Similarly to the legitimate signal we have the following parameters:
 Ns is the number of satellite signals being spoofed, usually Ns = N ;
 Asi and φsi(t) are the amplitude and the phase of the spooﬁng signal respectively; they
can be tuned in order to perform speciﬁc attacks;
 The attacker who wishes to deceive the defender must use the same ranging signals Ci(t);
this is possible because spreading sequences are part of the speciﬁc GNSS standard like
in Galileo [34]; spoofer's code delay τsi(t) are the key elements to induce false ranging
measurements to the defender; during an ongoing attack they will be in general diﬀerent
from the legitimate ones: τsi 6= τi;
 Dˆi(t) is the best estimate of the data signal available to the spoofer: the data signal may
be predictable or encrypted depending on the defence strategies possibly implemented.
When the spoofer is performing the attack, the signal received by the defender is
ytot = y(t) + ys(t) + ν(t) (2.15)
where ν(t) is the received noise.
Meaconing
The simplest spooﬁng attack is meaconing. A spoofer employing meaconing receives the signal
coming from satellites and replays it immediately to the victim. In this case Asi > Ai so to
overwhelm the legitimate signal. The position computed by the victim will be the spoofer's
antenna position. This approach, although simple to implement, does not permit the attacker
to induce arbitrary position computations to the victim. To do so the spoofer has to synthesize
separately the delays τsi that will be diﬀerent from τi. τsi should also be consistent with the Earth
geometry, otherwise receivers employing receiver autonomous and integrity protection (RAIM)
would easily detect spooﬁng thanks to consistency checks [11].
Whatever signal the spoofer decides to send, he must ﬁrst induce the victim to lock with
the false signal. To do so the attacker can use jamming. Jamming is the deliberate use of noise
signals to interfere and block radio communications. In our case this results in the victim to
re-start acquisition phase. Then, if spoofed amplitudes Asi are signiﬁcantly grater than the true
ones Ai, the attacked receiver will lock on the false signal with high probability.
A technique to induce the victim to lock on the false signal that does not require jamming
is shown in Fig. 2.4 in successive snapshots, from top to bottom. The three red dots visible
in each snapshot are the DLL lock points used to continuously maintain lock on the current
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Figure 2.4: A sequence of frames describing the procedure through which the victim locks on
the spooﬁng signal. Image taken from [12].
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of a portable spoofer device attack. Image from [12].
ranging signal. In the ﬁrst snapshot they are aligned with the correlation peak generated by
the genuine satellite signal. The spoofer initially search for the right phase alignment with the
genuine signal. Thus amplitudes Asi are low and correspond to the second correlation peak in
the ﬁrst two snapshots. Once the spooﬁng signal aligns with the legitimate one, the spoofer
increases transmission power, such that Asi > Ai. Thanks to the power advantage the victim
locks on the spooﬁng signal (third snapshot). Now the spoofer can drag-oﬀ victim's lock position
(last two snapshots) so to ﬁnally induce false range measurements.
At the time of the Volpe report no known devices existed capable of carrying on such attacks.
Things changed with [12] where the authors successfully developed a portable GPS civilian
spoofer. One of the challenges of performing the attack in Fig. 2.4 is the fact that the spoofer
has to know the true values Ai and has to gain accurate knowledge of the target receiver position
and velocity. This is needed in order to build a properly synchronized counterfeit signal relative
to the genuine satellite signals and to avoid detection. A portable GPS spoofer overcomes those
issues by design. Such a device can be placed right next to the victim antenna so that PVT
parameters are approximately the same, due to proximity.
Nulling
An alternative spooﬁng technique is nulling [10].The objective of nulling is to completely cancel
out the legitimate signal from the total received signal ytot of (2.15). The spoofer sends Ns = 2N
signals where half of these are the nulling signals. To be eﬀective nulling signals must obey the
following rules. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the nulling signals are the second half
and have index i+N for i = 1, · · · , N , then:
Ci+N (t) = Ci(t) (2.16a)
Dˆi+N(t)=Di(t) (2.16b)
As[i+N ] = Ai (2.16c)
τs[i+N ](t) = τi(t) (2.16d)
φs[i+N ](t) = φi(t) + pi, (2.16e)
where cancelling occurs thanks to the opposite phases in (2.16e). As we can imagine by looking
at 2.16 nulling is diﬃcoult because it requires very precise knowledge of the victim's legitimate
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received signal. Although achieving code and data synchronization is reasonably simple, exact
carrier phase alignment and amplitude matching is more diﬃcult.
Vestigial signal defence [16] exploits the aforementioned nulling diﬃculties in order to detect
spooﬁng. Supposing the attacker is not able to completely cancel out the legitimate signal from
the victim's receiver, vestiges of the true ranging signal are still present. To detect this signal
the receiver needs to save, in a diﬀerent buﬀer, the current output of the tracking correlators.
Then he looks for the ranging signal being tracked at the moment and removes it from the buﬀer.
Once the this has been done the receiver performs tracking in the buﬀer by correlation with the
same PRN sequence. We recall that a would-be spoofer needs to use the same PRN sequence as
the satellite signals he intends to spoof. The resulting correlation is compared with a threshold
and if the correlation value exceeds the threshold, then we conclude that a spoofed signal was
indeed present.
2.3 Navigation message authentication
One of the main defence strategies against spooﬁng attacks is relying on the cryptographic
mechanism to introduce unpredictability in the navigation message so that building a counterfeit
signal would be diﬃcult. Encryption may be used at the chip level [26], or at the data level [22]-
[25]. Navigation message authentication (NMA) generally refers to protocols that use encryption
to provide authentication and integrity protection services to the user, i.e. he should be able to
autonomously verify that the ranging signal are coming from a trusted source (satellites) and
that they are not being modiﬁed by malicious entities [27].
All NMA approaches put in place trade-oﬀs between performance and costs. From the per-
formance point of view a good NMA technique should maximize robustness against attacks by
using for example long cryptographic keys and secure key management functions. This however
may result in communication overhead, especially in low-rate data channel such as Galileo OS
dissemination channel (125bps), or extra computation and memory requirements for the receiver
to handle.
Asymmetric cryptography such as digital signature (DS) is suited for GNSS applications [28]
[29] because of simplicity and scalability in key management. DS schemes however introduce
substantial overheads in terms of computational complexity and size of signatures. Symmetric
cryptography on the other hand [24] [25] does not suﬀer from key distribution issues as users
must share the same secret key as the system. However, secret keys are stored in the device
to permit computation of cryptographic functions and this requires tamper-resistant hardware
module.
2.3.1 One-way key chain protocols
Among all NMA schemes one-way key chain protocols [30] [31] are promising techniques because
they exploit advantages of symmetric encryption and deal with key distribution in a delayed
fashion, as we see next.
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Figure 2.6: Tesla authentication protocol. Image from [27]
TESLA
Timed eﬃcient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) [30] employs a key-disclosure paradigm.
The transmitter authenticates the message he wants to send with a secret key, known only by
him, yielding a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is sent to the receiver along
with the original message. After some time the key is disclosed and the receiver can verify the
authenticity of the received message.
The protocol is shown in Fig. 2.6. The transmitter chooses the ﬁrst key kL randomly and
recursively generates all other keys ki for i = L− 1, . . . , 0 by successively applying the one-way
function F (·). We recall that a one-way function is by deﬁnition easy to compute, i.e. given
the input, eﬃcient algorithms compute the output, and at the same time it is hard to ﬁnd an
input that yields a given output. k0 is the root key and has to be separately signed using DS
and sent at the beginning. Mi with i = 1, . . . , L are the messages to be sent. Each message
Mi is signed with the corresponding key ki yielding its MACi = S(Mi, ki), where S(·, ·) is the
signing function. The transmitted packet however does not contain ki, but a key kj with a lower
index j < i. Thanks to the one-way function characteristics the receiver gains no information
about ki and the only way he has to verify MACi is to wait for the future disclosure of ki itself.
Instead, knowing kj , the receiver can authenticate the previously received keys kj−d, d > 0, by
recursively applying F (·). The recursion stops as soon as the receiver reaches k0 or he ﬁnds an
already authenticated key. With the authenticated keys the receiver can verify MACs and hence
accept or refuse the corresponding message.
Digital signal amortization
Digital signal amortization (SigAm) technique has been applied to GNSS in [31]. Like TESLA,
SigAm uses a chained digest authentication scheme, but this time a chain authenticates only one
(longer) message and each subsequent new message require a new digest chain.
Fig. 2.7 shows the authentication protocol based on SigAm. n is the chain index and
m = 1, . . . ,M is the step number in the chain. Data message Di(n) depends also on n because,
as we said, each message has its own chain. Chain construction starts from the computation
of the digest Hi(n,M) = h(n,M), where h(·, ·) is a one-way function and i indexes satellites,
as each diﬀerent satellite has its own navigation data. The rest of the digests are computed as
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Figure 2.7: Authentication scheme based on SigAm. Image from [27]
follows:
Hi(n,m) = h(Di(n), Hi(n,m+ 1)) m = M − 1, . . . , 1. (2.17)
In other words each subsequent digest is computed from the previous one and the same data mes-
sage Di(n). Diﬀerently from TESLA, here the navigation data is embedded in the computation
of the chain. The last digest Hi(n, 1) is again signed using DS: si(n) = S(Di(n), Hi(n, 1)). The
message sent to the user then comprises si(n), Di(n) and all digests Hi(n,m) withm = 1, . . . ,M .
The receiver applies (2.17) to the received digests and then veriﬁes separately si(n). If all the
veriﬁcations succeed the message is accepted.
In case a malicious user breaks the chain, in TESLA he could then authenticate a forged
message that will be accepted. This won't happen with SigAm because all digests are function
of the same navigation data and a forged message would need a new chain.
2.4 Prediction based attacks
Spooﬁng relies on the construction of a counterfeit signal that must resemble the legitimate one.
The attack is then even more eﬀective if the spoofer is able to predict the legitimate signal in
advance with respect to the user. Unpredictability introduced by NMA makes the construction of
a consistent counterfeit signal more diﬃcult. However the attacker has still got eﬀective attacks
against NMA secured signals [13] [22].
2.4.1 Security code estimation and reply attack
NMA introduces unpredictability in the data stream or at the chip level. A general model for a
GNSS signal protected with some security code is the following [13]:
Yk = wkck cos(2pifIF tk + θk) +Nk. (2.18)
Yk are the samples exiting the radio frequency front end of a GNSS receiver and the sampling
period is considered to be smaller than the chip period. ck ∈ {+1,−1} is the current chip symbol,
fIF is the carrier frequency, tk is the receiver time and θk is the carrier phase. wk ∈ {+1,−1} is
a security code with code period Tw and models unpredictability, be it at the chip level or data
level (Tw will change accordingly). Nk models thermal noise and interference: it is a sequence of
iid zero-mean Gaussian noise samples with variance σ2s
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The attacker, by observing (2.18), attempts to predict the security code wk and, as soon as he
gets a reliable estimate, he immediately injects it in the signal replica generator so to perform a
spooﬁng attack. This is called security code estimation and reply attack (SCER). The generated
counterfeit signal is
yˆk = wˆkc(τk) cos(2pifIF tk + θk) = wˆksk, (2.19)
where sk , c(τk) cos(2pifIF tk + θk) and we assume that the attacker can easily estimate code
delay and carrier phase of (2.18). wˆk is the estimated value of the security code.
The security code estimation is carried out by looking at the diﬀerent samples within the same
chip period and by continuously updating the estimate as soon as more samples are observed.
First a matched ﬁlter is applied in accordance to the theory of optimum detection [35] and
supposing that the attacker perfectly knows the signal structure sk. Let Wl be the lth value of
the security chip and kl the ﬁrst sample within the lth chip. Then the matched ﬁlter output is
Zl(n) =
2
n
kl+n−1∑
k=kl
Yksk, (2.20)
where n is the number of samples being observed. Due to the linearity of the ﬁltering operation
Zl(n) is distributed as a Gaussian random variable with mean E [Zl(n)] = Wl where E [·] is the
expected value. The variance is σ2Z(n) = 2σ
2
s/n. Then Zl(n) can be modelled as
Zl(n) = Wl +Nl(n) Nl(n) ∼ N
(
σ2Z(n)
)
. (2.21)
Note that the variance of the noise component in (2.21) decreases as n increases meaning that
the estimate gets better as we observe more samples. The attacker however wants n to be as
small as possible so that his time advantage over the defender is greater.
The expression of the estimate of Wl varies based on what optimality criterion the attacker
chooses. We summarize here three criterions without derivation, which can be found in [13]. The
three diﬀerent estimate expressions are:
1. maximum likelihood
WˆMLl (n) = Zl(n); (2.22)
2. maximum a posteriori
WˆMAPl = sgn(Zl(n)); (2.23)
3. minimum mean square error
WˆMMSEl = tanh
(
Zl(n)
σ2Z(n)
)
. (2.24)
The overall estimation scheme is presented in Fig. 2.8. A numerical simulation of the MMSE
and MAP criterion is shown in Fig. 2.9. We can see how the estimate stabilizes as time goes on.
Note that due to the sgn(·) function the output of the MAP criterion is either 1 or -1 (hard),
while MMSE output is soft and can be any real value.
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Figure 2.8: Security code estimation scheme. Figure from [13].
Figure 2.9: Numerical simulation of MMSE and MAP estimation. Figure from [13].
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Detection strategy
The author of [13] also proposes a detection strategy for the SCER attack performed by the
defender. The detection strategy is based on an hypothesis test that involves two scenarios: the
received signal is genuine; the received signal is a counterfeit signal and the genuine one has been
nulled. The evaluation of the likelihood ratio between the two hypothesis yields the following
detection test, that is to be compared with a threshold:
Sl =
kl+M−1∑
k=kl
ykβ(nlk)Wlsk. (2.25)
We refer to Sl with chip statistic and M is the number of samples per security chip. (2.25)
is a weighted correlation between the received samples yk and the genuine signal Wlsk. The
weighting function is β(nlk) with nlk being the ﬁrst k samples of the lth chip. β depends on
the chosen security code estimation strategy and its behaviour is such that it weights more the
ﬁrst samples of the chip where the two signals, the genuine one and the counterfeit one, are
more distinguishable. The computation of Sl assumes that the defender knows the true value of
the security code Wl. It is assumed that the defender either can reconstruct it or that it gets
disclosed after some delay.
By looking at several chip statistics {Sl : l = 1, 2, . . . } detection performances can be im-
proved by computing a symbol level detection statistic. Let S = [Slm , Slm+1, . . . , Slm+N−1]T be
the collected N chip statistics and let s be a particular realization of S. Then the symbol statistic
is [13]
L(s) = as˜T s˜, (2.26)
where a is a constant and s˜ is a linear function of s depending again on the security code
estimation technique chosen for the attack.
Thresholds for comparison with the detection statistics (2.25) (2.26) are computed given a
desired value of probability of false alarm or miss detection.
2.4.2 Forward error estimation attack
SCER attack focuses on the received signal in a chip by chip or symbol by symbol fashion as if
they were independent. Transmission of the navigation data, however, involves channel coding
which introduces dependencies between the transmitted symbols. The redundancy introduced
by channel coding can be exploited by the attacker to predict the entire codeword without the
need of receiving all its symbols. If the attacker has high signal-to-noise ratio he will need
only half of the symbol (supposing a 1/2 rate code is used) to decode the whole codeword.
Moreover, not all bits of the navigation message are unpredictable because NMA cannot occupy
all bandwidth. This increases the prediction performance because the attacker needs less symbols
to retrieve the whole codeword. Also, the attacker is not constrained to predict all symbols
perfectly. Actually he will send to the defender random symbols at the beginning, when the
attacker doesn't have a reliable codeword estimate. The receiver will be initially unaware of the
ongoing attack and will consider wrong symbols as corrupted by thermal noise. Forward error
correction (FEC) provided by channel coding will most likely correct wrong predicted symbols.
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If NMA is implemented decoded symbols are fed to the cryptographic veriﬁcation function, but
the veriﬁcation will succeed because the received codeword has been successfully reconstructed
by FEC. At this point the defender thinks the ranging information he has received is authentic
while the attacker may have forged a counterfeit ranging signal. This attack methodology is
called forward estimation attack (FEA) [22].
2.4.3 State modelling attack
As discussed in section 2.4.1 we consider that the defender implements also a correlation based
SCER detection. This can indeed frustrate FEA attack because can cause the defender to be
aware of the ongoing attack during the ﬁrst received samples. At this time the attacker has
not yet estimated the codeword and can only send random symbols. However this issue can be
overcome by the attacker as we see next.
Authors in [22] summarize the correlation based defence technique as follows. The receiver
implements a coherent integration to produce a vector of noisy received samples r = s˘ + n. The
integration is performed within the leading edge of of the received signal, of which the information
content are the samples in s˘, because this is the period of time when it is more likely to detect
the spooﬁng attack (see 2.4.1). Then he correlates r with the corresponding samples, denoted
with v˜, of the genuine security related symbols reconstructed or disclosed at the receiver:
γ = rT v˜. (2.27)
If the received signal is genuine then γ should follow a Gaussian distribution with mean nq, the
total number of samples. If instead the received symbols are random counterfeit symbols, then
γ is zero mean.
However correlation is an additive process and the receiver cannot discriminate between two
identical values of γ obtained with diﬀerent sets of correlation samples. This fact is exploited by
the state modelling attack (SMA). When estimating the kth symbol v˜k the adversary knows both
the previous symbols he sent sˆi for i = 0, . . . , k−1 and the genuine symbols v˜i for i = 0, . . . , k−1
that are disclosed as soon as the kth symbol is received. The attacker can then model the current
state of the correlation (2.27) before trying to estimate sk:
γˆk−1 =
k−1∑
i=0
s˘iv˜i. (2.28)
The attacker then knows which of the k − 1 previous symbols has been correctly guessed and
which not. Therefore he tunes the amplitude of the next symbol sk such that correlation (2.28)
remains high. For example if he discovers that symbol k− 1 has been incorrectly guessed, γˆ will
be lower and then he sends sk with greater amplitude in order to compensate.
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Chapter 3
Information-theoretic authentication
protocol
In this Chapter we propose our authentication protocol which is based on physical layer information-
theoretic security [33]. The related theoretical concepts are recalled in the Appendices. In section
3.1 we describe the various components of our system model: signaling, channel model and attack
model. Section 3.2 describes the authentication protocol and its design requirements. Perfor-
mance metrics are then analysed in section 3.3.
3.1 System Model
Fig. 3.1 shows our reference scenario. A satellite, Alice oﬀers positioning services via broadcast
transmission; the legitimate receiver is represented by Bob and the malicious user Eve has also
full access to the positioning signal transmitted by Alice. Indeed, we assume that Eve is in the
best possible situation such as high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and powerful and costly front-end
equipment. The ground segment communicates with Bob through an authenticated channel, i.e.
messages received by Bob over this channel come for sure from the ground segment (rather then
from Eve). The information travelling in the authenticated channel is available to all users, Eve
included.
3.1.1 Galielo signaling
Starting from the complete signal modulation presented in section 2.1.1 we rewrite here the no-
tation in order to simplify the model. This will favour a cleaner description of the authentication
protocol.
We call the data channel p(t) and it is given by
p(t) =
∑
i
disp(t− iTs), (3.1)
where Ts is the symbol period and di is the binary data stream. sp is the spreading pulse ant it
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Figure 3.1: Reference scenario.
is given by
sp(t) ,
Nc−1∑
i=0
ciu(t− iTc), (3.2)
where Tc is the chip period, {ci} for i = 0, . . . , Nc − 1 is the spreading sequence and u(t) is the
chip pulse. The chip pulse is a suitable waveform with ﬁnite support Tc [34] composed of a
sequence of signed rectangular functions as shown in Fig. 2.1. The pilot channel is similar to
p(t) but it has no binary data stream and will be neglected in this thesis since it is not relevant
for our authentication scheme.
3.1.2 Channel model
There are two channels in our model: the wireless navigation channel and the authenticated
channel.
Navigation channel
The navigation channel connects the satellite to the users and is the means through which the
ranging signals propagate. In our model of Fig. 3.1 we have two navigation channels: one from
Alice (A) to Eve (E), and the other from Alice to Bob (B) . Denoting with hmn(t) the impulse
response of the channel between each couple of users, with m,n ∈ {A,B,E}, the signals received
by Bob and Eve are respectively
rB(t) = (st ∗ hAB)(t) + wB(t) (3.3)
rE(t) = (st ∗ hAE)(t), (3.4)
where wB(t) is a Gaussian process with power spectral density (PSD) N0/2 modelling the noise
introduced by Bob's RF equipment, st is the signal transmitted by Alice and ∗ denotes the
convolution. Note that we pose ourselves in the best possible condition for Eve thus her signal
is not aﬀected by noise.
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In an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel the impulse response is an ideal unitary
impulse and the received signals are
rB(t) = st(t) + wB(t) (3.5)
rE(t) = st(t). (3.6)
The channel between Eve and Bob is used by Eve to send counterfeit signals and do spooﬁng
attacks as we will see later.
Authenticated channel
We assume that the ground segment can communicate with all the users through an authenticated
data channel. The authenticated channel is assumed to be of large (inﬁnite) bandwidth and can
be for example an internet connection through mobile device. The authentication is ensured for
example by higher layer authentication protocols. The authenticated channel is public hence
also Eve has access to it while she can not modify its content. Even if, for the protocol to work,
we need the information travelling in the authenticated channel to be linked with that coming
from the satellites, we do not assume a ﬁne time synchronization between the signal in the
authenticated channel and the ranging signals. For this reason we assume that the authenticated
channel is worth-less for ranging purposes.
3.1.3 Attack model
Eve is the malicious entity and, as such, her objective is to forge a new signal (possibly with
wrong positioning informations), send it to Bob and let him believe it was transmitted by Alice.
If Eve knows in advance the signal transmitted by Alice (i.e. it is perfectly predictable), Eve
can superimpose a powerful time-shifted version of this signal to Alice's signal. Bob will lock
on the strongest signal by synchronization, and then will acquire the timing chosen by Eve.
As a consequence Eve will be able to induce the desired (false) ranging on Bob by properly
choosing the time shift. In order to avoid this, the signal must be unpredictable to Eve, so that
she cannot regenerate it. However, Bob must also be able to establish the authenticity of the
message, otherwise Eve will simply generate a consistent message with the desired timing and
Bob will again be deceived. One possible solution to provide unpredictability is to include random
bits into the data stream that are then conﬁrmed after transmission through the authenticated
channel. However, an attack is still possible in this setting, which is addressed by this paper.
Suppose that Eve is able to predict the signal of Alice after a time ∆. Then Eve will transmit
noise to Bob up to time ∆ when she will start transmitting the properly delayed signal to Bob.
We describe two attacks by which Eve can predict the entire ranging message with a delay ∆.
Symbol prediction attack
In this attack Eve works at the waveform level. The chip pulse u(t) is perfectly predictable
since it is part of the standard [34]. u(t) is the result of superposition and multiplication of
rectangular pulses and hence u(t) is a piecewise constant function. Eve's observation is still
piecewise constant because she is not aﬀected by noise as discussed before. Then, by reading a
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Figure 3.2: Transmitter scheme
small time portion ∆, with ∆ Tc, Eve can predict the whole chip symbol. The same holds for
the spreading pulse sp(t) because also the spreading sequence is part of the standard and hence
perfectly predictable once the ﬁrst chip symbols are known. Eve then can predict far in advance
the whole symbol and the binary data associated with it. This prediction operation requires fast
and accurate RF equipment but we assume that Eve has inﬁnite computational power.
Codeword prediction attack
Typically most of the transmitted bits are predictable ( e.g. ephemeris, navigation data, clock
synchronization bits) and only a few (with respect to the codeword length) bits are meant to
be secret or crucial for the authentication mechanism. Due to the error correction codes used
to protect the word, by observing a fraction of the codeword it is possible to identify the whole
codeword [22]
3.2 Authentication protocol
The basic idea of the proposed protocol is to superimpose a synchronous authentication signal
x(t) to the ranging signal p(t). The authentication signal cannot be decoded and predicted by
Eve as it remains secret to her, thus preventing the predictive attacks. This is achieved by using
concepts of conﬁdential message transmission in physical layer security [33], by obfuscating a
message V with artiﬁcial noise (AN) w∗(t). After transmission of p(t) + x(t) + w∗(t) both the
AN and the message V are revealed to Bob (and Eve), through the authenticated channel. Then
Bob can remove the AN from the originally received signal, decode the authentication message
and check its correspondence with V to conﬁrm the authenticity of the received signal. We know
detail the proposed solution.
The authentication protocol consists of two phases.
First phase In the ﬁrst phase Alice encodes a secret authentication message V in a codeword
Xn. The codeword enters the modulator which outputs constellation symbols xk working at
symbol time Ts. Then the spreader multiplies each symbol for a spreading sequence yielding
yi = xbi/Nccci mod Nc (3.7)
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Figure 3.3: Receiver scheme.
every chip period Tc. Finally the unit energy interpolator ﬁlter gTx(t) =
1√
Nc
u(−t) yields the
continuous time signal
x(t) =
∑
k
xksx(t− kTs) (3.8)
sx(t) =
∑
i
yiu(t− iTc) (3.9)
In order to guarantee the secrecy of message V , we use AN superimposed to x(t), so that even
if Eve has a noiseless receiver, she cannot decode (and predict) V . Therefore Alice generates
a continuous time white Gaussian AN w∗(t) with variance σ2w∗ . Signals x(t) and w∗(t) are
superimposed to the ranging signal p(t) described in Section 3.1.1 and the signal transmitted by
Alice becomes
st(t) = p(t) + x(t) + w
∗(t). (3.10)
The transmission scheme is shown in Fig. 3.2. x(t) is by design orthogonal to p(t) (as detailed
in Section 3.2.3), hence all the users can extract p(t) from the received signal and use it for the
standard ranging procedures. The authentication protocol then works on the remaining part of
the received signals. After the removal of p(t) the signals of Bob and Eve are
r′B(t) = x(t) + w
∗(t) + wB(t) (3.11)
r′E(t) = x(t) + w
∗(t). (3.12)
Second phase In the second phase the receiver samples and despreads the received signal as
reported in Fig. 3.3 to obtain
xˆ′k = xk + w
∗
k + wB,k, (3.13)
where
w∗k =
∑
i
ci
∫ iTc
(i−1)Tc
w∗(τ)gTx(iTc − τ)dτ (3.14)
wB,k =
∑
i
ci
∫ iTc
(i−1)Tc
wB(τ)gTx(iTc − τ)dτ (3.15)
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are still iid AWGN samples with zero mean and power σ2w∗ and σ
2
wB
. Similarly also Eve can do
the same operations yielding
xˆ′E,k = xk + w
∗
k. (3.16)
The synchronization for sampling is obtained from the ranging signal p(t). Through the authen-
ticated channel the samples w∗k are revealed to Bob who cancels them before detection to obtain
the decoded message Vˆ . Actually, sending a complex-valued signal through the authentication
channel would require an inﬁnite number of bits. Instead we can send a quantized version of
w∗(t) so to make the number of bits ﬁnite. This number is a parameter that can be tuned to
trade-oﬀ between performance and cost. We denote the quantization map with Q and deﬁne the
quantization error
w
(q)
k , w
∗
k −Q(w∗k). (3.17)
In this case the signal at the input of the detector is
xˆ′′k = xk + wB,k + w
(q)
k (3.18)
Note that for perfect reconstruction, i.e. with no quantization, it is wq(t) = 0. Deﬁnitions and
results of the quantization theory are recalled in Appendix B and the links with the authentication
signals are the following:
 the input signal is w∗(t);
 the quantization error is wq(t).
At this point Bob can demodulate and decode the signal x(t) as shown in Fig. 3.3. It is
essentially the inverse scheme of the transmitter, with a hat ·ˆ indicating that the symbols are
the received noisy counterpart of the transmitted ones. At the end Bob decode the message Vˆ .
Together with w∗(t) the ground segment also reveals the original message V . If Vˆ = V Bob
declares that the portion of p(t) superimposed to x(t) received in the ﬁrst phase is authentic and
comes from Alice. Otherwise Bob generates an exception and the same portion of p(t) is declared
not authentic. Note that since both sample and frame synchronization are obtained from p(t),
any misalignment between p(t) and x(t) would result in an error of the decoded message V .
3.2.1 Protocol analysis
With the introduction of the artiﬁcial noise w∗(t) the prediction attacks become impossible for
Eve, since the chip waveform is obfuscated by noise. The unpredictability applies only on x(t)
since p(t) is orthogonal to w∗(t), but this is not a problem because we are using only x(t) to
transmit the authentication message V . In the ﬁrst phase then V is undecodable both for Bob
and for Eve. In the second phase the revelation of the artiﬁcial noise w∗(t) (or it's quantized
version) makes x(t) intelligible and decodable so that Bob can retrieve Vˆ . Note that now also
Eve can decode x(t), but this is not a problem because the portion of p(t) to be authenticated
has already been received and processed in the ﬁrst phase. Eve however has still access to the
fully predictable p(t) and could attack Bob by delaying it so that to induce false pseudo-range
measurements without interfering with x(t). We need indeed x(t) to be tightly bonded to p(t)
3.2. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 31
so that a delay (or anticipation) in p(t) would result in Bob not being able to decode x(t). Not
decoding x(t) means that V 6= Vˆ and hence the attack is frustrated. This is possible and is
discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
The correctness of this protocol is the ability to properly authenticate the message coming
from Alice. This happens if Vˆ = V when Alice is transmitting, i.e. we must ensure that V is
decodable over the Alice-Bob channel. The security of the protocol must ensure that when Eve
is maliciously acting, the attack is detected, i.e. Vˆ 6= V . To summarize, we must ensure that
1. V is decodable by Bob after the second phase.
2. Eve does not know anything on V after the ﬁrst phase.
This corresponds to a wiretap transmission scenario. Speciﬁcally the legitimate received signal
is x′′k over which we require reliability ; the malicious received signal is x
′
E,k over which we require
secrecy.
We make two additional observations.
 The additional information in the second phase (Q(w∗k) and V ) can not be transmitted
over the same channel between Alice and Bob, otherwise if Eve was able to isolate Bob
from that particular signal, she could forge whatever signal she liked and authenticate it
too. Hence the additional information must be sent over the authentication channel.
 One can think of using a diﬀerent approach from noise removal to solve the authentication
problem and this is Incremental redundancy. With incremental redundancy, Alice sends
additional redundancy bits relative to V lowering the rate of the total channel code (con-
catenation of that used in the ﬁrst phase and with the redundancy bits) to the point that it
becomes decodable for Bob. This would avoid the inconveniences of sending noise samples
over the authentication channel. However the approach fails in the following scenario. Eve
receives a codeword corrupted by the noise w∗(t). She can not decode, she is uncertain
between a pool of possible codewords. She selects one of them, the "closest" in terms of
probability, she uses it to authenticate a forged signal p′(t) and sends it to Bob. Bob re-
ceives it and knows that in order to decode he must wait for the redundancy bits coming in
the second phase. The redundancy bits are designed to correct the received word into the
transmitted one. This happens only if the received codeword is suﬃciently close (again, in
terms of probability) to the original one, but Eve will select one such codeword with high
probability. Hence Bob will always decode correctly the message V and authenticate Eve's
signal.
3.2.2 Protocol requirements
The requirements for the protocol are:
1. Orthogonality between x(t) and p(t). This requirement ensures that the authentication
signal does not interfere with the navigation signal, thus ensuring that a legacy receiver
not implementing the authentication features is not aﬀected. w∗(t) should be designed
carefully, in order to avoid compromising the nature of other signals involved. Speciﬁcally
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legacy receivers not implementing the authentication protocol must not be aﬀected, hence
w∗(t) should not interfere with p(t).
2. Secrecy of the message V to Eve. The message must not be known to Eve and we express
this condition as
I(V ; r′E(t)) = 0, (3.19)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information function. Note that (3.19) implies also I(V ; r′B(t)) =
0 since Eve has the best possible channel. In this way we guarantee that in the ﬁrst phase
no one is able to decode x(t), thus preventing the prediction attacks.
3. Reliability on decoding V at Bob's side in the second phase:
PBe , P[Vˆ 6= V ] = 0, (3.20)
where P(·) denotes the probability.
4. Synchronization. Since x(t) and p(t) are orthogonal, Eve can always distinguish between
the two messages and operate a predictive attack on p(t). She can then delay or anticipate
p(t) without interfering with the authentication procedures. We must then require x(t)
to be synchronized to p(t) so that a delay in the latter would cause the authentication
protocol to fail.
Secrecy and synchronization requirements deal with the security metric of the protocol since
they both aim to maintain V secret from Eve. Reliability and orthogonality instead deal with
correctness since are the necessary conditions to let Bob properly decode V and authenticate
p(t).
We now revise the requirements and obtain design criteria for our protocol.
3.2.3 Orthogonality
About the artiﬁcial noise w∗(t) it is useful to recall here the theorem of irrelevance from the
theory of optimum detection [35]. In a communication system let r be the vector representation
of a received signal and α the transmitted symbol. Suppose that r can be split into two parts
r = [r1, r2] such that the probability of r2 given r1 and α is independent of the particular
transmitted symbol n, that is
pr2|r1,α(ρ2|ρ1, n) = pr2|r1(ρ2|ρ1). (3.21)
The theorem of irrelevance states that the optimum receiver can disregard the component r2 and
base its decision only on the component r1. In our context this ensures that if we build w
∗(t)
laying in a diﬀerent basis from that of p(t) then this will not interfere with the reception of the
positioning signal.
An orthonormal base for the signal (2.1) is the set of signals {φi(t)} deﬁned as
φi(t) =
1√
Er
rect
( t− 1/2− iTc
Tc
)
i = 0, . . . , Nc − 1, (3.22)
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where Er is the energy of each single rect pulse. A possible way of designing w
∗(t) would be
as follows. First generate a Gaussian process w(t) and project it on the base {φi(t)} ﬁnding
coeﬃcients wi such that
wi =
∫ +∞
−∞
w(t)φ∗i (t)dt (3.23)
w∗‖(t) =
Nc−1∑
i=0
wiφi(t). (3.24)
Then by subtracting w∗‖(t) to w(t) we obtain a signal orthogonal to p(t), i.e.
w∗(t) = w(t)− w∗‖(t). (3.25)
This is still a Gaussian process because (3.23) and (3.24) are linear transformations of another
Gaussian process.
Another way to obtain w∗(t) starts from the deﬁnition of orthogonality between w∗(t) and
p(t) ∫ +∞
−∞
w∗(t)p∗(t)dt =
∑
i
d`ci
∫ (i+1)Tc
iTc
w∗(t)dt = 0. (3.26)
Then a suﬃcient condition for orthogonality is∫ (i+1)Tc
iTc
w∗(t)dt = 0. (3.27)
In general there are inﬁnite signals that verify (3.27). For example, focusing on one symbol
period [0, Ts] with Ts , NcTc, w∗(t) can be generated starting from Nc diﬀerent Gaussian
processes w∗i (t) with support Ti = [iTc, iTc + Tc/2] and for the remaining half of the chip period
using −w∗(t). Then we can strengthen the secrecy by still generating w∗i (t) for half the chip
period, but choosing at random the time instant t′i ∈ [iTc, iTc + Tc/2] such that
w∗(t) =

w∗i (t) if iTc ≤ t < t′i
−w∗i (t) if t′i ≤ t < t′i + Tc/2
w∗i (t) if t
′
i + Tc/2 ≤ t ≤ (i+ 1)Tc
(3.28)
for t ∈ [iTc, (i+ 1)Tc]. (3.29)
Actually the most practical solution is the following. First generate a stationary Gaussian
process w(t) with 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts and then project it on the energy-normalized version of sp(t), i.e.
ws =
∫ Ts
0
w(t)
sp(t)√
Ess
dt, (3.30)
with
Ess =
∫ Ts
0
s2s(t)dt. (3.31)
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Then subtract to obtain w∗(t):
w∗(t) = w(t)− ws sp(t)√
Ess
. (3.32)
In this way w∗(t) is orthogonal only to the speciﬁc pulse used for data transmission allowing
us to still use rect based pulses for x(t) provided that we use diﬀerent spreading coeﬃcients.
w∗(t) must however be orthogonal to all the pulses built with the spreading sequences used for
transmitting the ranging signal p(t).
3.3 Protocol performance analysis
3.3.1 Secrecy and reliability requirements
As previously observed this model corresponds to a wiretap transmission channel, where the
legitimate channel is x′′k while the eavesdropper channel is x
′
E,k. In order to compute capacities
we need to deﬁne Bob's and Eve's SNR. Fig. 3.4 shows the equivalent discrete-channel model
for the transmission of symbols xk. We drop here for simplicity encoder and modulation blocks.
Consider the transmission of the signal x(t) as in (3.8) with Esx = 1. If we consider also unit
energy real Gaussian symbols xk, the SNR before the despreading ﬁlter, in Tc domain, is
Γ =
Esx/Nc
σ2wB
=
1
Ncσ2wB
. (3.33)
After the despreading operation it becomes
ΓB = NcΓ =
1
σ2wB
. (3.34)
Similarly for Eve we have
ΓE = NcΓ =
1
σ2w∗
, (3.35)
σ2wB and σ
2
w∗ are the variances of the noise samples at Tc. Channel capacities are then:
CB =
1
2
log2 (1 + ΓB) (3.36)
CE =
1
2
log2 (1 + ΓE) . (3.37)
The same holds for complex Gaussian signals apart from the 1/2 factor. We can now apply
(A.13) to obtain
Cs = CB − CE . (3.38)
By looking at the previous equations we deduce that in order to have a positive secrecy capacity
it must be
σ2w∗ > σ
2
wB
. (3.39)
3.3. PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 35
Spreader + Despreader
Figure 3.4: Equivalent discrete-channel model.
This means that we are forcing Eve's channel to be worse than it really is, since it doesn't
naturally suﬀer from thermal noise.
Note that it holds:
lim
σ2
w∗→∞
Cs = CB. (3.40)
In other words even if we completely destroy Eve's channel the secrecy capacity can not grow
indeﬁnitely, as it is still bounded by Shannon's capacity on Bob's channel.
In case we send the quantized version of w∗k, xˆ
′′
k has as additive noise also wq(t) and Bob's
SNR becomes:
Γ′B =
1
σ2wB + σ
2
wq
, (3.41)
where σ2wq is the variance of wq(t). Note that we implicitly assumed that the variance of the sum
wB(t)+wq(t) is the sum of the corresponding variances. However this is a reasonable assumption
because the quantization error can be assumed uncorrelated from the input, as seen in appendix
B. Regarding Bob's capacity we can not assume that noise wq(t) is Gaussian, since it is actually
often modelled as uniform distributed (see appendix B). Hence the total additive noise is not
Gaussian and the capacity expression for the AWGN channel does not hold exactly. However,
we still consider as an approximation the equivalent AWGN channel with total noise variance
σ2wB + σ
2
wq and capacity given by
CB =
1
2
log2(1 + Γ
′
B). (3.42)
3.3.2 Synchronization
We now discuss Bob's decoding performance degradation in the presence of a delay attack by
Eve. If Eve delays p(t) by  > 0, Bob receives
p(t− ) + x(t) + w∗(t). (3.43)
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We recall that Eve can do this because p(t) is predictable, unlike x(t) that is submerged by noise.
Since synchronization is obtained from p(t − ) the ﬁltering and despreading of x(t) is aﬀected
by interference. Using (3.9) we can write the receiving ﬁlter and the despreading operation of
Fig. 3.3 as∫ Ts
0
x(τ + )sx(τ)dτ =
∫ Ts−
0
x0sx(τ + )sx(τ)dτ +
∫ Ts
Ts−
x1sx(τ − Ts + )sx(τ)dτ
= αx0 + βx1
, (3.44)
where x1 is an interferer, α < 1 and β are deterministic constants that depend only on the
particular spreading pulse, i.e.
α =
∫ Ts−
0
sx(τ + )sx(τ)dτ (3.45)
β =
∫ Ts
Ts−
sx(τ − Ts + )sx(τ)dτ. (3.46)
We see that interference is present and lowers Bob's demodulating performances. The syn-
chronization requirement formalize as follows: α and β should be as small and big as possible
respectively for those values of  we want Bob to be protected. Indeed, if this requirement
is satisﬁed the secrecy capacity is lowered such that Bob won't be able to verify Eve's signal,
frustrating her attack. Similarly, for a negative delay − it is:∫ Ts
0
x(τ − )sx(τ)dτ =
∫ 
0
x−1sx(τ + Ts − )sx(τ)dτ +
∫ Ts

x0sx(τ − )sx(τ)dτ
= αx0 + βx−1,
(3.47)
with
α =
∫ 
0
sx(τ + Ts − )sx(τ)dτ (3.48)
β =
∫ Ts

sx(τ − )sx(τ)dτ. (3.49)
To evaluate numerically how much the capacity of Bob is aﬀected by the delay attack we consider
as SNR
ΓB =
α2
σ2wB + β
2
, (3.50)
assuming we are transmitting unit energy symbols, and use it to compute the secrecy capacity.
Note that if there are no delay attack (3.50) applies with α = 1 and β = 0.
3.3.3 Constellation constrained system
We now investigate the performances of the protocol in case of constellation constrained system.
We consider in particular M-Phase Shift Keying (M-PSK) modulation as it is a constant envelop
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modulation technique which is best suited for satellite transmission.The secrecy capacity is still
Cs = CB − CE , but this time there is no close expression available for CB and CE and we must
resort to numerical integration. The generic scheme for computing the capacity in a M-PSK
channel is as follows. Γ is the reference SNR at the symbol level; x is the random variable of
the constellation symbols α ∈ S = {e jpiM , e 2jpiM , . . . , e (M−1)jpiM } with pdf px(α); y = x + w is the
received symbol with pdf fy(b); w is complex Gaussian with variance σ
2
w = 1/Γ and σ
2
w/2 for
each component (real and imaginary). From well known information theory results [36] capacity
is:
C = H(y)− log2(pieσ2w) (3.51)
with
H(y) =
∫
C
fy(b) log2
1
fy(b)
db (3.52)
fy(b) =
∑
α∈S
1
piσ2w
e
− |b−α|2
σ2w px(α). (3.53)
It is now suﬃcient to set Γ = ΓB for the computation of CB and σ
2
w = σ
2
w∗ for CE .
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Chapter 4
Numerical results
In this Chapter we present a number of numerical results evaluated using Matlab scripts.
4.1 Secrecy capacity and delay attack
In ﬁgure 4.1 the secrecy capacity (3.38) is shown as a function of σ2w∗ considering typical values
of Γ = −20 dB and Nc = 4092. The red line is the value CB. Note that the secrecy capacity is
zero when σ2w∗ ≤ σ2wB
We want now to see how the synchronization requirement of section 3.2.3 can help Bob to
understand if an attack is ongoing thanks to the degradation of the secrecy capacity. We have to
evaluate numerically the SNR (3.50) for each value of . α and β can be computed from (3.44)
and (3.47) and then plugged into (3.50). Eve's SNR is taken from (3.35) and the secrecy capacity
is (3.38).
In ﬁgure 4.2 is shown how Cs decreases due to diﬀerent values of the delay , given σ
2
w∗ = −6
[dB], Γ = −20 and a PRN sequence taken from the standard [34]. The plot changes only slightly
based on what PRN sequence is chosen and the overall behaviour is the same. Now we can think
of using diﬀerent Tc pulses other than rect as shown in ﬁgure 4.3. γ < 1 is a parameter that can
be tuned n order to adjust the amount of energy we want to allocate to the pulse. The smaller
γ, the more secure results we get in terms of frustrating Eve's delay attack. This is shown in
Fig. 4.4 where γ = 0.2. We note considerable improvements with respect to Fig. 4.2, at the cost
of more complexity since we are working with pulses smaller than Tc. Actually this may not be
feasible for the receiver, because it is typically a cheap device.
We now assume that all the correlations in (3.44) and (3.47) are carried out with the receiver
using always the spreading pulse (3.2) even if the transmitter uses the pulses in Fig. 4.3. Actually
this is the more realistic scenario where the user equipment is cheap and cannot work at lower
sampling periods than Tc. Fig. 4.2 remains unchanged, while Figures 4.4a and 4.4b become
Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Two observations. First, note that Fig. 4.5 is not symmetric with
respect to  as a consequence of Fig. 4.3a being asymmetric itself. Secondly, the value at  = 0
of Cs is diﬀerent (lower) from the previous ﬁgures, σ
∗
w being equal in both cases. This is because
the value α in (3.50) is no more 1 for  = 0 since even with perfect synchronization you gather
less energy in every single chip period given that we use unit gain pulses. To re-gain the same
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Figure 4.1: Secrecy capacity versus σ2w∗
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Figure 4.2: Degradation of secrecy capacity with respect to diﬀerent delays.
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Figure 4.3: Two diﬀerent Tc pulses
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(a) Degradation of Cs using pulse in Fig. 4.3a.
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(b) Degradation of Cs using pulse in Fig. 4.3b.
Figure 4.4: Degradation of Cs obtained using pulses in Fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.5: Degradation of secrecy capacity with respect to diﬀerent delays using pulse 4.3a only
at the transmitter.
level of Cs as before one need to upscale the side pulses of Fig. 4.3 proportionally to γ.
4.2 M-PSK modulation
We now go through the same calculations in the case of complex modulation. Speciﬁcally we use
PSK with order M . As we did for Fig. 4.1 we set ΓB = 16 [dB] and let σ
∗
w vary. The resulting
secrecy capacity is shown in Fig. 4.7 for diﬀerent values of M and for px(α) = 1/M .
Note that by doubling M we gain one bit of secrecy capacity in the limit values represented
by dashed lines. This is because in general for M-PSK it holds
lim
Γ→+∞
C = log2M. (4.1)
However ΓB = 16 [dB] is not suﬃciently high to let Bob's channel reach CB = log2M forM = 16
and 32. This and (3.40) tell us that with ΓB = 16 we don't gain more secret bits by using bigger
constellations than M = 16.
Now the same ﬁgures of section 4.1 are obtained with M-PSK constellation (Figures 4.8, 4.9
and 4.10). The black line is always the complex Gaussian case.
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Figure 4.6: Degradation of secrecy capacity with respect to diﬀerent delays using pulse 4.3b only
at the transmitter. γ = 0.3.
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Figure 4.7: Secrecy capacity for M-PSK channel as a function of σ∗w.
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Figure 4.8: Degradation of secrecy capacity for various delays using rect pulse at transmission.
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Figure 4.9: Degradation of secrecy capacity for various delays using pulse of Fig. 4.3a.
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Figure 4.10: Degradation of secrecy capacity for various delays using pulse of Fig. 4.3b and
γ = 0.3.
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Figure 4.11: Channel capacity CB for ΓB = 16 [dB] and varying σ
2
w∗
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Figure 4.12: Eve's channel Capacity for varying σ2w∗
4.2.1 Eﬀects of quantization
We need to compute the SNR Γ′B as deﬁned in (3.41): the value of σ
2
wq are obtained as
σ2wq =
1
Λq
, (4.2)
where Λq is deﬁned in Appendix B. In the literature the values of Λq (see appendix B are
tabulated as a function of the number of bits b used for the representation of each sample. Λq
varies also depending on the input distribution of the quantizer. In Table 4.13 are shown the
values of Λq for a Gaussian input. The numbers for the uniform quantizer are obtained with
the procedure described in Section B.2, while the numbers for the non uniform quantizer are
obtained with the algorithms brieﬂy recalled in section B.3.
The secrecy capacity is shown In Fig. 4.14 as a function of σ2w∗ for diﬀerent values of b. The
black line is the theoretic value with perfect noise cancellation. Clearly, the more bits we use for
digital representation, the better we approach the theoretic limit. Note that with 4 bits we loose
less than a bit of secrecy capacity.
In Fig. 4.15 we compare the non uniform quantizer with the uniform quantizer. We expect
the non uniform quantizer to perform better, since it is designed to speciﬁcally ﬁt the Gaussian
distribution input. This is indeed true, but the performance gain is very low due to Λq itself not
varying too much between Uniform and non Uniform quantizers.
4.2. M-PSK MODULATION 47
b
Quantizer type
Uniform non Uniform
1 4.40 4.40
2 9.25 9.30
3 14.27 14.62
4 19.38 20.20
5 24.57
6 29.83
7 35.13
8 40.34
Figure 4.13: Λq [dB] for diﬀerent values of b and for uniform and non uniform quantizers. The
reference for the numbers is [35].
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Figure 4.14: Secrecy capacity as a function of σ2w∗ for diﬀerent values of b.
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Figure 4.15: Secrecy capacity as a function of σ2w∗ for diﬀerent values of b and comparison
between uniform and non uniform quantizers.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future work
In this thesis we developed a new protocol for the authentication of GNSS signals. Performance
has been evaluated in AWGN channel model in terms of the secrecy capacity that can be achieved.
We showed that it is indeed possible to send a veriﬁcation message unpredictable to Eve thanks
to an artiﬁcial additive noise. The rate of the veriﬁcation message can be tuned to balance both
performance and cost of sending noise samples through the authenticated channel. By designing
suitable chip waveforms for the authentication signal we allow the legitimate receiver to detect if
a spoofer has sent a counterfeit signal. The counterfeit signal is a delayed (or anticipated) version
of the true ranging signal and the legitimate receiver will experience capacity degradation and
will be then unable to verify the authentication message.
In this work we considered only AWGN channel model in the evaluation of capacities. More-
over the secrecy capacity can be achieved only by using certain type of codes whose design criteria
are diﬀerent from the ones used for standard channel codes. A possible extension of this work
would be evaluating protocol performance in presence of more challenging channel models, which
introduce interference, and with signal protected by secrecy-focused channel codes. Future work
should also consider that additional interference is introduced by the presence of more satellites,
each of which transmitting its own veriﬁcation signal.
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Appendix A
Wiretap Channel
We concentrate on the original Wyner model in Fig. A.1: the degraded wiretap channel (DWTC).
We want to model the fact that in this simple scenario, where there are no feedback channels,
Bob needs some physical and intrinsic advantage with respect to Bob. In fact Eve's observation
(Zn) undergoes two transformations in the block diagram, one more than Bob. That's why in
the model we use the word degraded. It is not the most general model, but it ﬁts our needs for
now. A discrete memoryless DWTC is a 5-tuple (X , pY |X , pZ|Y ,Y,Z) where X , Y, Z are ﬁnite
alphabets and pY |X , pZ|Y are transition probabilities such that
pY n,Zn|Xn(yn, zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
pY |X(yi|xi)pZ|Y (zi|yi) ∀n ≥ 1 ∀(xn, yn, zn) ∈ (X n,Yn,Zn).
(A.1)
Morover, we deﬁne a (2nR, n) code Cn for the DWTC as being comprised by:
 a message setM = [1, . . . , 2nR];
 a source of local randomness at the encoder (R, pR), where R is a discrete memoryless
source with probability mass function pR;
Figure A.1: Degraded Wiretap Channel block diagram. Image from [33].
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 an encoding function f : M×R→ X n;
 a decoding function g : Yn →M∪ {?} with ? being an error message.
The objective is to design a code that allows the reliable transmission of message M to Bob,
while keeping it secret from Eve. We measure reliability with the probability of error
P(Cn) , P [Mˆ 6= M |Cn] (A.2)
, where P(·) denotes the probability function, and secrecy with the equivocation rate
E(Cn) , H(M |ZnCn) (A.3)
, where H(·) denotes the (conditional) entropy, or, equivalently, with leakage
L(Cn) , I(M ;Zn|Cn) = H(M |Cn)−H(M |ZnCn), (A.4)
where I(·; ·) denotes the (conditional) mutual information We would like the leakage to be zero,
so that Eve has no information on the transmitted messageM and the observation of Zn doesn't
help her in guessing M . This is a strong secrecy condition, but for mathematical tractability we
require a weake condition, i.e.:
lim
n→+∞
1
n
L(Cn) = 0. (A.5)
This is a weak condition because the leakage can indeed diverge, but slowly than n; however it
can be proven that the following results hold both for weak and strong secrecy condition.
For reliability, instead, we impose
lim
n→+∞P(Cn) = 0. (A.6)
A.1 Secrecy Capacity
Channel characteristics impose theoretical limits to our target conditions (A.5) and (A.6). The
limit to reliability is classical Shannon's channel capacity, while for secrecy we need to introduce
the secrecy capacity.
A weak rateequivocation pair (R,Re) is said to be achievable for the DWTC if there exists
a sequence of (2nR, n) codes {Cn} such that
lim
n→+∞P(Cn) = 0 (A.7)
lim
n→+∞
1
n
E(Cn) ≥ Re. (A.8)
The weak rate-equivocation region of a DWTC is
RDWTC , {(R,Re) : (R,Re) is achievable}. (A.9)
Finally, the weak secrecy capacity for the DWTC is
CDWTCs , sup
R
{R : (R,R) ∈ RDWTC}. (A.10)
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Note that if we specialize (A.8) for Re = R then (A.5) is satisﬁed since (1/n)H(M |Cn) = R for
n→ +∞. In this case all information transmitted at rate R is hidden from Eve.
Wyner's theorem characterizes secrecy capacity as follows:
CDWTCs = maxpX
I(X;Y |Z) = max
pX
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)), (A.11)
where pX is the probability mass distribution of X. By introducing channel capacities CB =
maxpX I(X;Y ) and CE = maxpX I(X;Z) we have:
CDWTCs ≥ CB − CE , (A.12)
where (A.12) holds with equality if channel transition probabilities are symmetric. In other
words secret transmission is possible if Bob has a better channel than Eve. Also, randomness at
the encoder plays a key role, as we see next.
A.1.1 Gaussian wiretap channel
The Gaussian wiretap channel (GWTC) is the continuous version of the DWTC and all the
results seen until now can be extended also to the Gaussian case. The channels between Alice
and Bob, Alice and Eve are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels and the transmitted
symbols Xi are Gaussian random variables. The secrecy capacity of the GWTC is
CGWTCs = CB − CE . (A.13)
A.2 Randomness for secrecy
The encoding function maps a message M and a realization of the local randomness R into a
codeword Xn. R is also independent of M . Thus we can write
I(Xn;Zn|Cn) = I(MR;Zn|Cn) (A.14)
H(R|MCn) = H(R|Cn) (A.15)
and using the mutual information chain rule, the leakage can be written as
1
n
L(Cn) = 1
n
I(Xn;Zn|Cn)− 1
n
H(R|Cn) + 1
n
H(R|ZnMCn). (A.16)
Randomness, in practice, is exploited by encoding random bits, i.e. a dummy message Md,
alongside the original message M . The dummy rate can then be deﬁned as
Rd =
1
n
H(Md|Cn) (A.17)
and Md can be used in place of R in (A.16). Moreover, by using jointly typical set decoding,
it can be shown that the third term on the right in (A.16) can be made arbitrarily small. The
leakage becomes
1
n
L(Cn) ≈ 1
n
I(Xn;Zn|Cn)−Rd (A.18)
that is we can cancel out all the information leaked to Eve by confusing him with a properly
designed random rate. Speciﬁcally, Rd should be picked as close as possible to CE .
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Appendix B
Quantization
In this appendix we recall the main deﬁnitions, models and results of the quantization theory.
Reference for this subject can be found in [35] and [37].
B.1 Description of the quantization process
The aim of a quantizer is to permit the digital representation of a real signal that otherwise
would require an inﬁnite number of bits. A quantizer can be mathematically described as a map
Q that takes as input a real value and yields as output another real value, but this time taken
from a ﬁnite set Aq:
Q : R→ Aq. (B.1)
Quantization comprises four elements:
 input signal sample s(k), with k ∈ N;
 a quantization function Q;
 quantized signal sq(k) ∈ Aq, where the L elements Qi of the set A are called output levels;
 codeword c(k) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1} which represents the value of sq(k). The number of bits
used for representing the quantized values is b = dlog2 Le.
The quantization map deﬁnes a partition of the the real set R with L disjoint intervals Ri =
(τi, τi+1] and assigns to each of these an output value Qi. The measure of the disjoint intervals
are called quantization step and are denoted by ∆i. In this way we introduce an error in the
representation of s(k) and it is deﬁned by
eq(k) = sq(k)− s(k). (B.2)
The quantization error is limited if the corresponding quantization step is ﬁnite (granular error),
while if the quantization step is inﬁnite (i.e. one of the extremes is +∞ or −∞) then the error
is unbounded (saturation error).
If the input signal signiﬁcantly diﬀers from a constant value and the quantization steps are
suﬃciently small, we can make the following assumptions on eq(k) in the granular region.
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 eq(k) is a white process:
E[eq(k)eq(k − n)] =
{
Mq n = 0
0 n 6= 0 , (B.3)
where Mq is the statistical power of eq(k).
 It is uncorrelated with the input signal:
E[s(k)eq(k − n)] = 0 ∀n. (B.4)
 It has a uniform distribution over each ∆i.
A measure of the performance of the quantization process is the signal-to-quantization error
ratio:
Λq =
E[s2(k)]
E[e2q(k)]
. (B.5)
B.2 Uniform quantizer
A uniform quantizer is a quantizer with L = 2b reconstruction levels and constant step size ∆
in the granular region. The granular region is the interval [−τsat, τsat] such that 2τsat = L∆
Assuming the input signal has zero mean and variance σ2s the optimum design for the quantizer
is obtained with the following algorithm.
1. Determine τsat such that the saturation probability is suﬃciently small. In this way eq(k)
is approximately always granular and it can be shown that
Mq ' ∆
2
12
. (B.6)
2. Choose L so that Λq assumes a desired value.
3. Given L and τsat we have
∆ =
2τsat
L
. (B.7)
The highest Λq is obtained for a uniform input distribution: it can be shown that the uniform
quantizer is the optimum quantizer for this kind of input.
B.3 Non-uniforrm quantizers
If the input signal is not uniform, then the uniform quantizer is suboptimum. We can then
design non-uniform quantizers that better ﬁt the input distributions. There are diﬀerent design
procedure available. A class of these aims at minimizing the statistical power of eq(k) (minimum
mean-square error criterion). By deriving and setting to 0 Mq with respect to the reconstruction
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values Qi and with respect to τi, we get an expression of the optimum parameters as a function
of the input signal distribution ps(a):
τi =
Qi +Qi+1
2
(B.8)
Qi =
∫ τi
τi−1 aps(a)da∫ τi
τi−1 ps(a)da
. (B.9)
Max algorithm and Lloyd algorithm are two algorithms that, after a random initialization,
iteratively apply the previous equations until a stopping condition (e.g. a desired maximum
value of distortion) is met.
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